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1 Introduction 
 
It is not every prosecution that is concluded in favour of the accused person that 
necessarily leads to a successful claim for malicious prosecution. So much depends 
on the absence of a reasonable and probable cause, and the animus iniuriandi of the 
defendant in instigating, initiating or continuing the prosecution. It is widely 
accepted that reasonable and probable cause means an honest belief founded on 
reasonable ground(s) that the institution of proceedings is justified.1 It is about the 
honest belief of the defendant that the facts available at the time constituted an 
offence and that a reasonable person could have concluded that the plaintiff was 
guilty of such an offence. Ultimately, it is for the trial court to decide at the 
conclusion of the evidence whether or not there is evidence upon which the accused 
might reasonably be convicted.2 
 
In Hicks v Faulkner,3 Hawkins J defined reasonable and probable cause as "an 
honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded on 
reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which assuming 
them to be true, would reasonably lead to any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, 
placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was 
                                                 
*  Chuks Okpaluba. LLB, LLM (London), PhD (West Indies). Adjunct Professor of Law, Nelson 
Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare. E-Mail: okpaluba@mweb.co.za. 
1  Beckenstrater v Rottcher & Theunissen 1955 1 SA 129 (A) 136A-B; Newman v Prinsloo 1973 1 
SA 125 (T) 149H. 
2  S v Lubaxa 2001 2 All SA 107 (A) para 10; S v Suhuping 1983 2 SA 119 (B) 120H-121I; S v 
Khanyapa 1979 1 SA 824 (A) 838F-G. 
3  Hicks v Faulkner 1878 8 QBD 167 171, approved and adopted by the House of Lords in 
Herniman v Smith 1938 AC 305 316 per Lord Atkin. 
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probably guilty of the crime imputed".4 It was stated that the test contains a 
subjective as well as an objective element. There must be both actual belief on the 
part of the prosecutor and the belief must be reasonable in the circumstances.  
 
The necessary deduction, which the courts have for centuries made from that 
definition, is that there has to be a finding as to the subjective state of mind of the 
prosecutor as well as an objective consideration of the adequacy of the evidence 
available to him or her. This is tantamount to a subjectively honest belief founded on 
objectively reasonable grounds that the institution of proceedings was justified.5 A 
combination of both the subjective and objective tests means that the defendant 
must have subjectively had an honest belief in the guilt of the plaintiff and such 
belief must also have been objectively reasonable.6 As explained by Malan AJA in 
Relyant Trading, such a defendant will not be liable if he/she held a genuine belief in 
the plaintiff’s guilt founded on reasonable grounds. In effect, where reasonable and 
probable cause for the arrest or prosecution exists, the conduct of the defendant 
instigating it is not wrongful.7 For Malan AJA, the requirement of reasonable and 
probable cause "is a sensible one" since "it is of importance to the community that 
persons who have reasonable and probable cause for a prosecution should not be 
deterred from setting the criminal law in motion against those whom they believe to 
have committed offences, even if in so doing they are actuated by indirect and 
improper motives".8  
 
                                                 
4  It was held in Broad v Ham 1839 5 Bing NC 722 725 that the reasonable cause required is that 
which would operate on the mind of a discreet person; it must be probable cause which must 
operate on the mind of the person making the charge, otherwise there would be no probable 
cause upon which he/she could operate. There can be no probable cause where the state of 
facts had no effect on the mind of the party charging the other. See also Rambajan Baboolal v 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2001 TTHC 17 (Slollmeyer J).   
5  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko 2008 3 All SA 47 (SCA) para 20; 
Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe 2007 1 All SA 375 (SCA) para 14 (hereafter Relyant 
Trading); Beckenstrater v Roffcher & Theunissen 1955 1 SA 129 (A) 136A-B. 
6  Joubert v Nedbank Ltd 2011 ZAECPEHC 28 para 11. 
7  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 178. 
8  Relyant Trading para 14 citing in support, Beckenstrater v Roffcher & Theunissen 1955 1 SA 129 
(A) 135D-E. Thus it was held in Noye v Robbins and Crimmins 2010 WASCA 83 para 368 that the 
trial judge was correct to have found that what animated Inspector Robbins at the time he laid 
charges and throughout the period when they were pending was his "own view" that the 
"evidence warranted putting Noye on trial for the charges proposed" and that in doing so he 
acted for the purpose of bringing a wrongdoer to justice.  
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The requirement of reasonable and probable cause in proving malicious prosecution 
tends sometimes to be confused with the requirement of reasonable ground to 
suspect that an offence has been committed in order for a peace officer to arrest 
any person without a warrant.9 Further, although reasonable and probable cause 
and malice are distinct grounds for the action for malicious prosecution, they are 
often difficult to distinguish one from the other as they tend to overlap. For, it is 
improbable to find that a prosecutor acted maliciously where there is reasonable and 
probable cause to prosecute or to find that the defendant who was motivated by 
malice had reasonable and probable cause to prosecute. The finding that there was 
reasonable and probable cause to prosecute invariably neutralises the existence of 
malice in the circumstances as the latter is contingent on the former. In any event, 
the two requirements appear inseparable in most instances of malicious prosecution.  
 
In order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove 
all four requirements; namely, that the prosecution was instigated by the defendant; 
it was concluded in favour of the plaintiff; there was no reasonable and probable 
cause for the prosecution; and that the prosecution was actuated by malice.10 
Although the first two requirements may appear to be straight-forward, they are no 
less difficult to prove than the last two. The burden of proving that there is 
reasonable and probable cause for prosecuting a person is as challenging as proving 
that the prosecutor was motivated by malice. That this is the case in the South 
African law of malicious prosecution is illustrated by the judgments of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Relyant Trading; Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development v Moleko11 and Kgomo J in Bayett v Bennett.12 Recent Australian and 
English13 cases similarly bear witness to this proposition. While the present 
                                                 
9  Section 40(1)(b) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
10  See eg Mohamed Amin v Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee 1947 AC 322 (PC) 330; Miazga v Kvello 
Estate 2009 3 SCR 339 (SCC) para 3; A v New South Wales 2007 230 CLR 500 (HCA) para 1; 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko 2008 3 All SA 47 (SCA) para 8; 
Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 5 SA 94 (SCA) para 16; Bullen and Leake 
Precedents of Pleadings 350-356; Clerk, Lindsell and Dugdale Torts 972; Neethling, Potgieter and 
Visser Law of Delict 343; Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 923. 
11  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko 2008 3 All SA 47 (SCA). 
12  Bayett v Bennett 2012 ZAGPJHC 9 para 167. 
13  For instance, the explanation offered by Richards LJ in Alford v Chief Constable of 
Cambridgeshire Police 2009 EWCA Civ 100 para 48 is in point. Having reached the conclusions 
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investigation concentrates on reasonable and probable cause in an action for 
malicious prosecution, in appropriate instances references may occasionally be made 
to malice. An important adjunct to the subject matter is the concept of the objective 
sufficiency of the information available to the prosecutor, which brings to the 
discussion the leading Australian case of A v New South Wales,14 where a ten-point 
guideline was laid down.  
 
Equally relevant to this discussion are the contributions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada grappling with the modern concept of malicious prosecution since Nelles v 
Ontario15 through Proulx v Quebec (Attorney General)16 down to Miazga v Kvello 
Estate17 - the three Supreme Court judgments around which the modern law of 
malicious prosecution in Canada could easily be constructed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that the police not only had reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused person committed 
the offence but also that the prosecutor had reasonable and probable cause for prosecuting, the 
Lord Justice found it unnecessary to deal with the issue of malice. The reasoning behind so 
concluding was that since the judge held that '"[h]ad the claimant proved a lack of reasonable 
and probable cause for prosecuting, he would have succeeded in establishing malice in the sense 
of improper motive" (para 153). This is not, "as I read the judgment and as counsel for the Chief 
Constable agreed, a finding of malice, but an observation that there would have been an 
improper motive if the appellant had proved a lack of reasonable and probable cause for 
prosecuting, which he did not. That was because the evidence showed that part of the thinking 
of those responsible for the prosecution was to make an example of the appellant, as a police 
officer, and to show the public that the police were treating seriously innocent deaths caused in 
police road pursuits; a point that can be linked to the disquieting degree of publicity given to the 
arrest and charging of the appellant. However, that was as far as the point went; and the finding 
that there was reasonable and proper cause for the prosecution meant that the question of 
malice or improper cause became irrelevant to liability. It would be wrong in the circumstances 
to go any further into the issue.'" The next is Moulton v Chief Constable of the West Midlands 
2010 EWCA Civ 524 paras 26-27 and 44 where Lady Justice Smith held that the trial judge had 
been right to hold that there was reasonable and probable cause to commence the prosecution 
but had made no specific reference to evidence of malice at the time of the charge, as he had 
not needed to do so. The claim could not succeed in respect of that period if there was 
reasonable and probable cause to prosecute. But, as a fact, there was not a shred of evidence 
from which it could be inferred that, at that early stage, the officers were motivated by anything 
other than a legitimate desire to bring the appellant to justice. The Justice of Appeal held that 
that there was never a time when the police did not have reasonable and probable cause to 
bring and continue the prosecution. In that case, it was not necessary to say anything about 
malice. See also Howarth v Gwent Constabulary 2011 EWHC 2836 (QB) paras 130-131. 
14  A v New South Wales 2007 230 CLR 500 (HCA) (A v NSW) para 1. 
15  Nelles v Ontario 1989 2 SCR 170 (SCC) (Nelles). 
16  Proulx v Quebec (Attorney General) 2001 206 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC) (Proulx). 
17  Miazga v Kvello Estate 2009 3 SCR 339 (SCC) (Miazga 2), 2008 282 DLR (4th) 1 (Sask CA) 
(Miazga 1). 
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2 Distinguishing the test for reasonable ground to suspect 
 
The law of wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution are closely linked, but the 
principles governing each cause of action diverge at the point when the arrest and 
detention translate into prosecution. But because the requirement of reasonableness 
is common to both causes; reasonable ground to suspect18 or, as it is described in 
some jurisdictions, "reasonable grounds";19 "reasonable cause";20 or "good cause to 
suspect";21 on the one hand and reasonable and probable cause to prosecute on the 
other, there is the tendency to conflate the different tests. However, Lord Devlin laid 
down the test of reasonable suspicion as:  
 
arising at or near the starting-point of an investigation of which the obtaining of 
prima facie proof is the end.22 When such proof has been obtained, the police case 
is complete; it is ready for trial and passes on to its next stage. It is indeed 
desirable as a general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is 
complete. But if arrest before that were forbidden, it could seriously hamper the 
police. To give power to arrest on reasonable suspicion does not mean that it is 
always or even ordinarily to be exercised. It means that there is an executive 
discretion. In the exercise of it many factors have to be considered besides the 
strength of the case. The possibility of escape, the prevention of further crime and 
the obstruction of police inquiries are examples of those factors with which all 
judges who have had to grant or refuse bail are familiar.23 
 
Building on the foregoing, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh 
JJ spoke in George v Rocket24 of the required state of mind, contrasting suspicion 
with a belief or a reason to believe, and held that suspicion in its ordinary meaning is 
a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: "I suspect but I cannot 
                                                 
18  Section 40(1)(b) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 of South Africa. 
19  Section 24(6) Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (UK); s 495(1)(a) Canadian Criminal Code, 
1985. See e.g. Holgate-Mohammed v Duke 1984 AC 437 (HL); Castorina v Chief Constable of 
Surrey 1996 LGR 241 (CA); Al Fayeed v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis 2004 EWCA 
Civ 1579 (CA); R v Storey 1990 1 SCR 241 (SCC); Collins v Brantford Police Services Board 2001 
204 DLR (4th) 669 (OntCA); Hudson v Brantford Police Services Board 2001 204 DLR (4th) 645 
(OntCA). 
20  Section 352 Crimes Act 1900-24 of Australia. See eg Ruddock v Taylor 2005 222 CLR 612 (HCA); 
Zaravinos v NSW 2005 214 ALR 234 (NSWCA). 
21  Section 315 Crime Act, 1961 of New Zealand. See eg Attorney General v Hewitt 2000 2 NZLR 
110 (HC); Neilsen v Attorney General 2001 3 NZLR 433 (CA); Zaoui v Attorney General 2004 
NZCA 228 (CA). 
22  Hussien v Chong Fook Kam 1970 AC 942 (HL) 948.  
23  Hussien v Chong Fook Kam 1970 AC 942 (HL) 948. 
24  George v Rocket 1990 170 CLR 104 (HCA). 
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prove". The facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient 
reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be 
shown. In their opinion, it is a positive finding of actual apprehension or mistrust. 
The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need 
to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that 
the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the 
subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more 
slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting 
to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce 
that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something 
to surmise or conjecture.25  
 
The judgment of Malan AJA in Relyant Trading is also instructive in this regard. The 
Acting Justice of Appeal began by casting wrongful arrest in its well-known mode as 
consisting in the wrongful deprivation of a person’s liberty. Again, liability for 
wrongful arrest is strict, neither fault nor awareness of the wrongfulness of the 
arrestor’s conduct being required.26 Further, an arrest is malicious where the 
defendant makes improper use of the legal process to deprive the plaintiff of his 
liberty.27 However, in both wrongful and malicious arrest not only a person’s liberty 
but also other aspects of his or her personality may be involved, particularly 
dignity.28 It was held in Newman v Prinsloo29 that in wrongful arrest the act of 
restraining the plaintiff’s freedom is that of the defendant or his agent for whose 
action he is vicariously liable, whereas in malicious arrest the interposition of a 
judicial act between the act of the defendant and apprehension of the plaintiff 
makes the restraint on the plaintiff’s freedom no longer the act of the defendant but 
the act of the law.30 On the other hand, Malan AJA held that malicious prosecution 
                                                 
25  George v Rocket 1990 170 CLR 104 (HCA) 115-116. See also O'Hara v Chief Constable of RUC 
1997 AC 286 293C-D. 
26  Smit v Meyerton Outfitters 1971 1 SA 137 (T) 139D; Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 
(A) 154E-157C; Todt v Ipser 1993 3 SA 577 (A) 586F-587C; Donono v Minister of Prisons 1973 4 
SA 259 (C) 262B. 
27  Thompson v Minister of Police 1971 1 SA 371 (E) 373E-G. 
28  See Burchell, Personality Rights 353ff.  
29  Newman v Prinsloo 1973 1 SA 125 (T) 127H. 
30  Relyant Trading para 4.  
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consists in the wrongful and intentional assault on the dignity of a person 
comprehending also his or her good name and privacy.31 The requirements are that 
the arrest or prosecution be instigated without reasonable and probable cause and 
with "malice" or animo iniuriarum.32 Although the expression "malice" is used, it 
means, in the context of the actio iniuriarum, animus iniuriandi.33 Quoting per 
Wessels JA in Moaki v Reckitt and Colman (Africa) Ltd:34  
 
Where relief is claimed by this actio the plaintiff must allege and prove that the 
defendant intended to injure (either dolus directus or indirectus). Save to the extent 
that it might afford evidence of the defendant’s true intention or might possibly be 
taken into account in fixing the quantum of damages, the motive of the defendant 
is not of any legal relevance.35 
 
Another important distinguishing factor between reasonable suspicion to arrest and 
the requirement of reasonable and probable cause in the law of malicious 
prosecution is the factor of proof. In malicious prosecution the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff, who must show that all four elements developed by the courts over the 
years are present. In an action for wrongful arrest, on the other hand, the burden is 
always on the defendant to justify the arrest and detention36 and he/she must prove 
in defence that he/she had reasonable suspicion as grounds to arrest as one of four 
statutory jurisdictional facts in terms of section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 1977.37 Restated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Safety and 
                                                 
31  Heyns v Venter 2004 3 SA 200 (T) 208B. 
32  Thompson v Minister of Police 1971 1 SA 371 (E) 373F-H; Lederman v Moharal Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 1969 1 SA 190 (A) 196G-H. 
33  Heyns v Venter 2004 3 SA 200 (T) 208E-F; Moaki v Reckitt and Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 3 SA 98 
(A) 104A-B; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 124-125. 
34  Moaki v Reckitt and Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 3 SA 98 (A) 104B-C. 
35  Relyant Trading para 5. Emphasising the issue of the lawfulness of a prosecution in National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) paras 37-38, Harms DP said that "a 
prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper purpose. It will only be 
wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable grounds for prosecuting were absent … The 
motive behind the prosecution is irrelevant because, as Schreiner JA said in connection with 
arrests, the best motive does not cure an otherwise illegal arrest and the worst motive does not 
render an otherwise legal arrest illegal (Tsose v Minister of Justice 1951 3 SA 10 (A) 17). The 
same applies to prosecution. This does not, however, mean that the prosecution may use its 
powers for 'ulterior purposes'. To do so would breach the principle of legality." See also 
Highstead Entertainment (Pty) Ltd t/a 'The Club' v Minister of Law and Order 1994 1 SA 387 (C). 
36  Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 4 SA 458 (CC) paras 24, 25. 
37  Section 40(1)(b) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
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Security v Sekhoto,38 the four jurisdictional facts which the defendant must plead are 
that: (a) the arrestor must be a peace officer; (b) that he or she entertained a 
suspicion; (c) that the suspicion was that the arrestee had committed a Schedule 1 
offence;39 and (d) that the suspicion was based on reasonable grounds. It was 
further clarified in Sekhoto that once these jurisdictional facts are met, it was not 
necessary to add a gloss to the section by requiring the arresting officer to consider 
the Bill of Rights before arresting the suspect.40 There was nothing in section 
40(1)(b) that could lead to the conclusion that its words contain a hidden fifth 
jurisdictional fact. If it be recalled that the purpose of an arrest is to enable the 
arrestor to bring the suspect to justice, it follows that the discretion to arrest without 
a warrant does not impose upon the officer the burden of digging into the Bill of 
Rights to satisfy himself/herself that no aspect of it has been violated before 
exercising that discretion. Once the suspect has been brought to court, the authority 
to detain inherent in the exercise of the power to arrest expires and the authority to 
detain the suspect shifts to the court.41 
 
The test for determining the existence of a reasonable suspicion is an objective one, 
that is, the grounds of suspicion must be those which would induce a reasonable 
person to have the suspicion.42 It is, therefore, not whether a police officer believes 
that he has reason to suspect, "but whether on an objective approach, he in fact has 
reasonable grounds for his suspicion".43 That is, "[a] reasonable person placed in the 
position of the officer must be able to conclude that there were indeed reasonable 
                                                 
38  Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 1 SACR 315 (SCA) (hereafter Sekhoto) para 6.  
39  S v Shininda 1986 1 SA 573 (T). 
40  See eg per Bertelsmann J Louw v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 2 SACR 178 (T) 186a-c, 
187e. See also Gellman v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 1 SACR 446 (W); Le Roux v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2009 4 SA 491 (KZP); Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 
2009 1 SACR 211 (E); Mvu v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 6 SA 82 (GSJ). Contra Charles 
v Minister of Safety and Security 2007 2 SACR 137 (W). 
41  Sekhoto para 42. 
42  R v van Heerden 1958 3 SA 150 (T) 152E. As Jones AJP put it in Rosseou v Boshoff 1945 CPD 
145 147: "… when one comes to consider whether he had reasonable grounds one must bear in 
mind that in exercising those powers he must act as an ordinary honest man would act, and not 
merely act on wild suspicions, but on suspicions which have a reasonable basis". 
43  Duncan v Minister of Law and Order 1986 2 SA 805 (A) 814D-E; Minister of Law and Order v 
Hurley 1986 3 SA 568 (A) 579F-G; Minister of Law and Order v Pavlicevic 1989 3 SA 679 (A) 
684G. 
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and probable grounds for the arrest".44 What is required is that the police officer 
must take account of all the information available to him/her at the time and base 
the decision to arrest on such information.45 What constitutes reasonable grounds 
for suspicion had to be judged against what was known or reasonably capable of 
being known at the relevant time.46 A belief or suspicion was capable of being 
reasonable even though founded on a mistake of law. The officer in question need 
not be convinced that the information in his/her possession was sufficient to commit 
for trial or convict, or to establish a prima facie case47 for conviction, before making 
the arrest.48  
 
As Jones J held in Mabona v Minister of Law and Order,49 the person claiming 
malicious arrest or malicious prosecution must not only allege but must go further to 
prove that the defendant acted maliciously and without probable cause.50 Thus, in 
Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security51 the court had to resolve the tension 
between the reasonable justifiability of the arrest and detention in this case and the 
subjective feeling of the police officer faced with the decision whether or not to 
                                                 
44  R v Storrey 1990 1 SCR 241 (SCC) 250-251. The phrase "reasonable and probable cause for a 
prosecution" according to Robertson and Jastrzebski Halsbury’s Laws of England para 472 is "an 
honest belief in the guilt of the accused based on a full conviction, founded upon reasonable 
grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would 
reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of an accuser, to 
the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed." See further 
Abbott v Refuge Assurance Co Ltd 1961 3 All ER 1074; Riches v DPP 1973 2 All ER 935; Fink et 
al v Sharwangunk Conservancy Inc 790 NYS 2d (10 February 2005); Chatfield v Comerford 1866 
4 F & F 1008; Lister v Perryman 1870 LR 4 HL 521; Baptiste v Seepersad and Attorney General 
of Trinidad and Tobago HC 367 of 2001 (unreported); Kennedy Cecil v Morris Donna and 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2005 TTCA 28 (T&T CA).  
45  Chartier v Quebec (Attorney General) 1979 2 SCR 474 (SCC); R v Golub 1997 34 OR (3d) 743 
(ONCA) 749. 
46  Per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, Ruddock v Taylor 2005 222 CLR 612 (HCA) 
626 para 40. 
47  Attorney General v Hewitt 2000 2 NZLR 110 (HC); Police v Anderson 1972 NZLR 233; Duffy v 
Attorney General 1985 CRNZ 599; Hussien v Chong Fook Kam 1970 AC 942 947-948; Caie v 
Attorney General 2005 NZAR 703 (HC) para 85; Niao v Attorney General High Court, Rotorua CP 
22/96, 11 June 1998. 
48  PHE v Ottawa-Carleton (Region) Police Service 2003 OJ No 3512 (SCJ) para 54. 
49  Mabona v Minister of Law and Order 1988 2 SA 654 (SE) 658E. See also Gellman v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2008 1 SACR 446 (W) para 72; Le Roux v Minister of Safety and Security 
2009 4 SA 491 (KZP) 498 para 24; Visagie v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 ZAECHC 2 
paras 20-23; Dallison v Caffrey 1964 3 WLR 385 (CA) 398; Holgate-Mohammed v Duke 1984 AC 
437 445(HL).  
50  A classical illustration of unlawful detention is Russel v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 
ZAECHC 161 para 11. 
51  Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security 2007 3 All SA 271 (T). 
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arrest and detain. Given the jurisprudence embedded in the case law, the question 
which the court had to address was whether the reasons put forward for the arrest 
and detention of the plaintiff satisfied the requirement of a discernible objective 
standard, which is what distinguishes a lawful arrest and detention from an arbitrary 
and unconstitutional one.52 The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the trial judge 
was in error to have concluded that the arresting officer was justified in effecting the 
arrest without warrant, since no Schedule I offence was committed in the 
circumstances of the case. And since no offence of sedition had been committed, it 
could hardly be said that the arresting officer reasonably suspected the first 
appellant of committing sedition.53 It was further held that by knowing that no 
offence of illegal gathering had been committed and nonetheless proceeding to 
charge the appellants, the officer acted wrongly. By continuing so to act, reckless as 
to the possible consequences of that conduct, the officer acted animo injuriandi.54  
 
There was no way the arrest in Le Roux could have satisfied the reasonableness test 
since Madondo J found that the arresting officer’s reason for the arrest and 
detention of the appellant was to demonstrate to her black colleagues that she was 
not motivated by racial prejudice in favour of the appellant. It was held that her 
action was not in the interest of justice as the arrest was not to secure the 
appellant’s attendance before the court or for the protection of the public. There was 
therefore no reason to support the decision to arrest, nor was there any rational 
connection between the detention of the appellant and the purpose the arresting 
officer ought to have set out to achieve. The detention of the appellant was 
accordingly unlawful. It was an unreasonable interference with his liberty and 
fundamental dignity.55  
 
In Canada, the courts adopt both the definition of reasonable and probable cause as 
well as the test postulated in Hicks v Faulkner56 by Hawkins J to determine if a 
                                                 
52  See also R v Wilson 1990 1 SCR 1291; R v Storrey 1990 53 CCC (3d) 316 324. 
53  Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 5 SA 94 (SCA) paras 14, 25. 
54  Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 5 SA 94 (SCA) para 20. 
55  Le Roux v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 4 SA 491 (KZP) para 41. See also A v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department 2003 1 All ER 816 (CA) 817. 
56  Hicks v Faulkner 1878 8 QBD 167 171. 
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prosecutor met that criterion.57 However, unlike the South African courts, the 
Canadian courts go further to treat that same test as applicable to the requirement 
of reasonable grounds to arrest a suspect in the first instance. In R v Storrey58 Cory 
J, referring to "reasonable and probable grounds" in section 450(1) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code,59 held that the Code required that an arresting officer must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable grounds on which to base the arrest. 
Those grounds must, in addition, be justifiable from an objective point of view. In 
other words, a reasonable person placed in the position of the officer must be able 
to conclude that there were indeed reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. 
However, the police need not demonstrate anything more than reasonable and 
probable grounds. It is important to note that Cory J emphasised that the police 
would not be required to establish a prima facie case for conviction before making 
the arrest.60  
 
3 Distinguishing the tort of abuse of process 
 
Apart from false imprisonment or malicious prosecution there is, under the English 
common law, a tort of abuse of process. This is distinct from the "shameful misuse 
of coercive power",61 or "a gross abuse of power"62 encountered in the unlawful 
conduct of police officers in arrests and detention cases bordering on the tort of 
misfeasance in public office. But like malicious prosecution, the abuse of process 
concerns misuse and abuse of the criminal process. Both of them deal with the 
deliberate and malicious use of the officer’s position for ends that are improper and 
inconsistent with the public duty entrusted upon the officer.63  
 
                                                 
57  Per Lamer J in Nelles v Ontario 1989 2 SCR 170 (SCC) 192. 
58  R v Storrey 1990 53 CCC (3d) 316 (SCC) 324. 
59  See now s 495(1) Canadian Criminal Code, 1985 referring to "reasonable grounds". 
60  See also per Osborne JA, R v Hall 1995 22 OR (3d) 289 (Ont CA); per Ground J, Wiche v Ontario 
2001 CanLII 28413 (ON SC) paras 33, 34 
61  Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop 2005 2 WLR 1324 (PC). 
62  Mahadeo Sookhai v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2007 TTHC 47 para 45. 
63  Per Charron J dissenting in Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board 2007 3 SCR 
129 para 182.  
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In its modern form, the tort of abuse of process would lie where it is shown that the 
defendant had set proceedings in motion with the object of achieving a purpose 
which was not within the scope of the process. Although the action is related to 
malicious prosecution, it is distinct from it. The action does not, like malicious 
prosecution, depend on the proceedings being completed, concluded or withdrawn 
before it can be instituted.64 It is an action initiated where "one who uses a legal 
process, whether criminal or civil against another primarily to accomplish a purpose 
for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the 
abuse of process".65 
 
Quite recently the English Court of Appeal restated the tort of abuse of process and 
extensively reviewed its relationship with the law of malicious prosecution. In Land 
Securities Ltd v Fladgate Fielder,66 the plaintiffs claimed damages against the 
defendants for the tort of abuse of process arising out of an application for judicial 
review made by the defendants of a decision by the Westminster City Council 
granting the plaintiffs planning permission. They alleged that the defendants were 
liable for substantial damages for the tort for threatening and bringing the judicial 
review proceedings, which was not to obtain relief against the planning authority by 
quashing the permission, but in order to put pressure on the claimants to assist the 
defendants to relocate their offices. The question before the Court of Appeal was 
whether or not the plaintiffs’ case was sufficiently arguable to be allowed to proceed 
to trial.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that there was no basis for extending the tort of abuse of 
process to the defendants’ proceedings for judicial review. In so holding, the court 
took the opportunity to formulate a six-point proposition of the law based on existing 
precedents.67 First, there was no general tort of malicious prosecution of civil cases 
                                                 
64  Grainger v Hill 1882-1883 11 QBD 440; Gilding v Eyre 1861 142 ER 584; Goldsmith v Sperrings 
Ltd 1977 2 All ER 566; Speed Seal Products Ltd v Paddington 1986 1 All ER 91. 
65  American Law Institute Torts s 682. See also Metall and Rohstoff v Donaldson Luflein and 
Jenrette Inc 1990 1 QB 391 469-470. 
66  Land Securities Ltd v Fladgate Fielder 2010 2 All ER 741 (CA) (Land Securities).  
67  Land Securities para 67 per Etherton LJ. 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
253 / 536 
 
except in three well-established heads of damage68 within the principles enunciated 
by Holt CJ in Savill v Roberts69 as amplified by Brett MR in Quartz Hill Consolidated 
Mining Co v Eyre70 and applied by the House of Lords in Gregory v Portsmouth City 
Council.71 Secondly, essential ingredients for a claim of malicious prosecution were 
the absence of reasonable or probable cause and that the proceedings had ended in 
favour of the person maliciously prosecuted. Thirdly, the only cases in which the tort 
of abuse of process had been successfully invoked concerned a blatant misuse of a 
particular process, namely arrest and execution, within the existing proceedings. 
Fourthly, in cases of abuse of process, it was irrelevant whether or not there was 
reasonable or probable cause for the proceedings or in whose favour they ended, or 
whether they had ended at all. Fifthly, statements in English authorities describing a 
broader application of the test of abuse of process were all obiter.72 Sixthly, as to 
the broader statements of principle, there was no clearly accepted approach for 
identifying what was sufficiently collateral to establish the tort of abuse of process.73 
 
The court refrained from defining precisely the limits of the tort of abuse of process. 
In any event, even if the tort could be committed outside circumstances of 
compulsion by arrest, imprisonment or other forms of duress, there were no heads 
of damage that had to exist for the invocation of the tort of malicious prosecution. 
As Etherton LJ explained:  
 
A different conclusion would not only go beyond the factual context of Grainger’s 
case and Gilding’s case, but would be inconsistent with the refusal of the House of 
Lords in Gregory’s case to extend the tort of malicious prosecution to all civil 
proceedings.74  
 
Further, it made no sense severely to limit the cause of action of malicious 
prosecution, an essential ingredient of which was that the proceedings had been 
                                                 
68  Namely, where the defendant's action amounts to a deprivation of the plaintiff's liberty, making a 
person incur expense, and where a person's fair fame and credit are injured. 
69  Savill v Roberts 1698 12 Mod Rep 208, 88 ER 1267. 
70  Quartz Hill Consolidated Mining Co v Eyre 1881-1885 All ER Rep Ext 1474 (CA) 1476.  
71  Gregory v Portsmouth City Council 2000 1 All ER 560 (HL). 
72  See eg Re A Debtor 1955 2 All ER 65. 
73  Land Securities para 67. 
74  Land Securities para 68. 
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brought without reasonable or probable cause, to three heads of damage, but to 
extend to all cases of economic loss a tort of abuse of process, which could apply 
even where the alleged abuser had a good cause of action. This is because the 
"dangers of parallel litigation and - echoing the concerns of Slade LJ in Metall and 
Rohstoff case75 - 
 
… deterring the pursuit of honest claims are obvious. The wider description of the 
tort of abuse of process in cases prior to Gregory’s case must be re-appraised in the 
light of the decision of the House of Lords in that case and the policy considerations 
underlying it. 76  
 
4 Objective sufficiency of the information available to the prosecutor 
 
Although the requirement of reasonable and probable cause is, like the other 
elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, a question of fact to be determined by 
the jury, that is not often the case, for it is invariably reserved for the judge to 
decide. At common law, once the facts in the case have been determined by the 
special verdict of the jury so required, the decision if, on those facts as found, the 
defendant had acted without reasonable and probable cause remains a decision 
solely for the judge.77  
 
The element of reasonable and probable cause is not established by the plaintiff who 
seeks only to prove that he was innocent. In Abrath v The North Eastern Railway 
Company,78 Brett MR held that in order to show that there was an absence of 
reasonable and probable cause for instituting the prosecution for conspiracy, there 
was no doubt that the plaintiff was bound to give some evidence of the 
circumstances under which the prosecution was instituted. It is therefore not 
sufficient for the plaintiff to show that he was innocent of conspiracy and that there 
was no substantial ground for charging him with conspiracy. It followed, therefore, 
that- 
 
                                                 
75  Metall and Rohstoff v Donaldson Luflein and Jenrette Inc 989 3 All ER 14 (CA). 
76  Land Securities para 68. 
77  Glinski v McIver 1962 AC 726 (HL) 778-780 per Lord Devlin.  
78  Abrath v The North Eastern Railway Company 1882-1883 11 QBD 440 (Abrath). 
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... if the plaintiff merely proved that, and gave no evidence of the circumstances 
under which the prosecution was instituted, it seems that the plaintiff would fail; 
and a judge could not be asked, without some evidence of the circumstances under 
which the prosecution was instituted, to say that there was an absence of 
reasonable and probable cause.79  
 
The Master of the Rolls concluded that the evidence which must determine the 
question of whether or not there was reasonable and probable cause must consist of 
the existing facts or the circumstances under which the prosecution was instituted. 
Bowen LJ agreed. According to him, when mere innocence wears that aspect, it is 
because the fact of innocence involves other circumstances which show that there 
was want of reasonable and probable cause. The Lord Justice cited as an instance 
where the prosecutor must know whether the story which he is telling against the 
man whom he is prosecuting is false or true. In such a situation, if the accused is 
innocent, it follows that the prosecutor must be telling a falsehood, and there must 
be a want of reasonable and probable cause. On the other hand- 
 
if the circumstances proved are such as that the prosecutor must know whether the 
accused is guilty or innocent, if he exercises reasonable care, it is only an identical 
proposition to infer that if the accused is innocent there must have been want of 
reasonable and probable cause. Except in cases of that kind, it never is true that 
mere innocence is proof of want of probable cause. It must be innocence 
accompanied by such circumstances as raise the presumption that there was a 
want of reasonable and probable cause.80  
 
The next point is that whether or not there is a reasonable and probable cause 
depends upon the materials which were in possession of the prosecutor at the time 
the prosecution was instituted and, further, upon whether or not those materials 
were carefully collected and objectively assessed. Addressing these issues in 
Abrath81 Bowen LJ said: 
 
Now there might be two views of the materials which were in the possession of the 
prosecution. It may be said that the materials were evidently untrustworthy or that 
they were obviously trustworthy, according as the one view or the other is taken of 
the facts. The burden of showing carefulness in the inquiry would be shifted 
according to the view of the facts adopted. If the materials were admittedly 
                                                 
79  Abrath 449. 
80  Abrath 462. 
81  Abrath 459. 
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untrustworthy, that would be a strong reason for throwing on the defendants the 
burden of showing that they, nevertheless, had been misled, after all their care, 
into relying upon worthless materials. If the materials were obviously trustworthy, 
they would be enough prima facie to justify those who trusted to them.82  
 
Quite recently, the High Court of Australia held in A v NSW that the enquiry about 
reasonable and probable cause has two aspects. The first is to decide whether the 
prosecutor did not have reasonable and probable cause for commencing or 
maintaining the prosecution. The second is that the material available to the 
prosecutor must be assessed,83 again, in two ways: (a) what did the prosecutor 
make of it? (b) What should the prosecutor have made of it? According to the court, 
to ask only whether there was material available to the prosecutor which, assessed 
objectively, would have warranted commencement or maintenance of the 
prosecution would deny relief to the person acquitted of a crime prosecuted by a 
person who not only acted maliciously but who is also shown to have acted without 
forming the view that the material warranted prosecution of the offences. 
Contrariwise, to ask only what the prosecutor made of the material that he or she 
had available when deciding to commence or maintain the prosecution would favour 
the incompetent or careless prosecutor over the competent and careful.84  
 
                                                 
82  It was held in A v NSW para 56 that the absence of reasonable and probable cause is to be 
determined on the material the prosecution had available when deciding whether to commence 
or maintain the prosecution, not whatever material may subsequently come to light. Further, 
"even if a prosecutor was shown to have initiated or maintained a prosecution maliciously (for 
example, because of animus towards the person accused) and the prosecution fails, an action for 
malicious prosecution should not lie where the material before the prosecutor at the time of 
initiating or maintaining the charge both persuaded the prosecutor that laying a charge was 
proper, and would have been objectively assessed as warranting the laying of a charge." See 
also Zreika v State of New South Wales 2011 NSWDC 67 para 134 (Zreika).  
83  As Keon J held in Maharaj v Government of RSA 2012 ZAKZDHC 6 paras 7-8, "the crucial issue is 
what information and evidence was available to the State when the decision to prosecute was 
taken and whether that, and any inferences to be drawn therefrom, were sufficient to at least 
prima facie point to the commission of an offence by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the impressions 
as to the credibility of the evidence and whether the allegations the various state witnesses 
deposed to may ultimately be proved are not relevant to the present trial". 
84  A v NSW para 58. In Zreika para 236, Judge Walmsley postulated that available material is to be 
identified as to whether it might be regarded as "inculpatory or exculpatory". 
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5 The Australian ten-point guideline  
 
The majority of the High Court of Australia in A v New South Wales85 emphasised86 
the elements of malice87 and absence of reasonable and probable cause88 and held 
that they were separate elements which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed in 
establishing the tort of malicious prosecution. For that purpose, there was no 
disharmony between the expressions of the applicable principles by Jordan CJ in 
Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd89 and Dixon J in Sharp v Biggs90 and 
Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain.91 The court then held that, where 
a prosecutor has no personal knowledge of the facts underlying the charge but acted 
on information received, the issue was not if the plaintiff had proved that the state 
of mind of the prosecutor fell short of a positive persuasion of guilt. Instead, the 
issue was if the plaintiff had proved that the prosecutor did not honestly form the 
                                                 
85  A v NSW para 1. 
86  A v NSW para 117. 
87  A v NSW paras 88-89. 
88  A v NSW paras 60-87. 
89  Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd 1938 38 SR (NSW) 466 469. The Chief Justice laid down five 
conditions which must be met in order for an officer to have reasonable and probable cause for 
prosecuting a person for an offence. To succeed on the issue of reasonable and probable cause 
the plaintiff had to establish that one or more of these conditions did not exist. They are: (1) the 
prosecutor must believe that the accused is probably guilty of the offence. (2) This belief must 
be founded upon information in the possession of the prosecutor pointing to such guilt, not upon 
mere imagination or surmise. (3) The information whether it consists of things observed by the 
prosecutor himself, or things told to him by others, must be believed by him to be true. (4) This 
belief must be based upon reasonable grounds. (5) The information possessed by the prosecutor 
and reasonably believed by him to be true must be such as would justify a man of ordinary 
prudence and caution in believing that the accused is probably guilty. 
90  Sharp v Biggs 1932 48 CLR 81 (HCA) 106. Dixon J held that: "Reasonable and probable cause 
does not exist if the prosecutor does not at least believe that the probability of the accused's 
guilt is such that upon general grounds of justice a charge against him is warranted. Such cause 
may be absent although this belief exists if the materials of which the prosecutor is aware are 
not calculated to arouse it in the mind of a man of ordinary prudence and judgment." Callinan J 
dissented (A v NSW para 165) on the ground that there was no reason why the court should 
depart, in relation to the first of the four elements necessary to establish the tort of malicious 
prosecution, from the test stated by Dixon J in Sharp v Biggs 1932 48 CLR 81 (HCA. The Court of 
Appeal was therefore right to prefer that test. 
91  Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain 1935 53 CLR 343 (HCA) 382. Repeating what 
he said in Sharp, Dixon J observed that: "when it is not disputed that the accuser believed in the 
truth of the charge, or considered its truth so likely that a prosecution ought to take place, and 
no question arises as to the materials upon which his opinion was founded, it is a question for 
the court to decide whether the grounds which actuated him suffice to constitute reasonable and 
probable cause". 
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view that there was a proper case for prosecution, or had proved that the prosecutor 
formed that view on an insufficient basis.92  
 
It was held in A v NSW that in evaluating the material that was available to the 
prosecutor arising from the investigations, the objective sufficiency of the material 
must be considered by the prosecutor and assessed in the light of all the facts of the 
particular case. With regard to the "objective standard of sufficiency", the majority 
observed:  
 
because the question in any particular case is ultimately one of fact, little useful 
guidance is to be had from decisions in other cases about other facts. Rather, the 
resolution of the question will most often depend upon identifying what it is that 
the plaintiff asserts to be deficient about material upon which the defendant acted 
in instituting or maintaining the prosecution. That is the assertion which may, we 
do not say must, depend upon evidence demonstrating that further inquiry should 
have been made.
93
 
 
The majority, pondering over the earlier question it had posed as to whether or not 
the grounds which actuated the prosecutor sufficed to constitute reasonable and 
probable cause, held:  
 
for like reasons it cannot be stated, as a general and inflexible rule, that a 
prosecutor acts without reasonable and probable cause in prosecuting the crime on 
the basis of only the uncorroborated statements of the person alleged to be the 
victim of the accused’s conduct. Even if at trial of the offence it would be expected 
that some form of corroboration warning be given to the jury, the question of 
absence of reasonable and probable cause is not to be decided according to such a 
rule.94 The objective sufficiency of the material considered by the prosecutor must 
be assessed in the light of all of the facts of the particular case.95 
 
                                                 
92  A v NSW para 118. See also: Glinski v McIver 1962 AC 726; Gibbs v Rea 1998 AC 786; Trobridge 
v Hardy 1955 94 CLR 147. 
93  A v NSW paras 84, 85, 87. 
94  Bradshaw v Waterlow and Sons Ltd 1915 3 KB 527 534. 
95  See also Landini v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWSC 1280 paras 39-41 where it was held 
that the plaintiff's onus was to establish that the facts and circumstances established in evidence 
concerning each prosecution instituted in 1980 and in 1982 were inconsistent with the existence 
of reasonable and probable cause. Hall J thus held that a prosecutor, in making an assessment 
of the purposes of making a sound judgment as to whether or not to charge the individual with a 
criminal offence, is entitled to have regard to all information held. This includes both information 
which constitutes admissible evidence in a criminal trial and other information which, though not 
admissible as evidence, may nonetheless have value in evaluating or assessing the reliability of 
evidence that is admissible. 
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A ten-point guideline surrounding principally the element of reasonable and probable 
cause was laid down by the majority in this case. The first of these propositions is 
that justice requires that the prosecutor, the person who effectively sets the criminal 
proceedings in motion, must accept the form of responsibility or accountability 
imposed by the tort of malicious prosecution.96 Secondly, insofar as one element of 
the tort of malicious prosecution concerns reasonable and probable cause, the 
question is not abstract or purely objective. The question is whether the prosecutor 
had reasonable cause to do what he did; not whether, regardless of the prosecutor’s 
knowledge or belief, there was reasonable and probable cause for a charge to be 
laid. The question involves both an objective and a subjective aspect97 
notwithstanding that it is often productive of difficulties in practice, because it 
essentially requires the plaintiff to establish a negative, rather than for the defendant 
to prove the existence of reasonable and probable cause.98 Thirdly, in the case of a 
public prosecution initiated by a police officer or a Director of Public Prosecutions or 
some other authority, where a prosecutor has no personal interest in the matter, no 
personal knowledge of the parties or the alleged events, and is performing a public 
duty, the organisational setting in which a decision to prosecute is taken could be of 
factual importance in deciding the issue of malice.99 
 
The fourth of the guidelines enunciated by the majority pertains to the five 
conditions laid down by Jordan CJ in Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd.100 It was 
stated that those five conditions may provide guidance about the particular kinds of 
issue that might arise at trial in those cases where the defendant prosecutor may be 
supposed to have personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the charge and the 
plaintiff alleges either that the prosecutor did not believe the accused was guilty, or 
that the prosecutor’s belief in the guilt of the accused was based on insufficient 
grounds. The five conditions were not, and could not have been, intended as directly 
                                                 
96  Glinski v McIver 1962 AC 726. 
97  A v NSW para 38. 
98  Per Heenan J in Noye v Robbins and Crimmins 2007 WASC 98 para 251 (Noye).  
99  A v NSW para 41. 
100  Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd 1938 38 SR (NSW) 466 469.  
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or indirectly providing a list of elements to be established at trial of an action for 
malicious prosecution. It would be wrong to understand them in that way.101 
 
In the fifth of the principles laid down, it was stated that if the plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant prosecutor did not have the requisite subjective state of mind when 
instituting or maintaining the prosecution, that is an allegation about the defendant 
prosecutor’s state of persuasion. The subject matter of the relevant state of 
persuasion in the mind of the prosecution is the sufficiency of the material then 
before the prosecutor to warrant setting the process of the criminal law in motion. If 
the facts of a particular case are such that the prosecutor may be supposed to know 
where the truth lies, the relevant state of persuasion will necessarily entail a 
conclusion, a belief of the prosecutor, about guilt.102 If, however, the plaintiff alleges 
that the prosecutor knew or believed some fact that was inconsistent with guilt, the 
                                                 
101  A v NSW para 66. 
102  Two subsequent judgments from New South Wales address the issue of the quality of the 
information available to the prosecutor at the time of the decision to prosecute. First, in Thomas 
v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWCA 316 para 105, Gyles AJA with the concurrence of the 
other members of the Court of Appeal held: "The material to be considered cannot be limited to 
that which is admissible in evidence. A reasonable basis for a decision by an investigating police 
officer to lay a charge is not to be equated with a magistrate's decision as to committal for trial 
or a trial judge's ruling on whether there is a case to go to the jury. The hypothetical reasonable 
prosecutor is not a judge or barrister specialising in criminal law. Neither is it necessary that the 
prosecutor be assured that all necessary witnesses will attend the hearing and give evidence in 
accordance with the information provided by them. The prosecutor may not be a public official. 
The decision to charge will often be taken promptly, if not immediately, in all kinds of 
circumstances. Investigations can be expected to continue where necessary, at least up to 
preparation of the brief of evidence for committal. That is not to suggest that these topics are 
not properly to be considered under this head. A practical assessment is required. Situations vary 
so much that it is not helpful to endeavour to lay down strict ground rules." See also Lister v 
Perryman 1870 LR 4 HL 521 538, 540 and 542 per Lords Westbury and Colonsay respectively; 
Hicks v Faulkner 1878 8 QBD 167 173-174, Birchmeier v Council of Municipality of Rockdale 1934 
51 WN (NSW) 201 202-203, Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd 1938 38 SR (NSW) 466 469-471. 
Again, in Landini v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWSC 1280 paras 41 and 42, Hall J held 
that in making an assessment for the purpose of making a sound judgment as to whether to 
charge an individual with a criminal offence, a prosecutor is entitled to have regard to all 
information held. "This includes both information which constitutes admissible evidence in a 
criminal trial and other information which, though not admissible as evidence, may nonetheless 
have value in evaluating or assessing the reliability of evidence that is admissible." His Honour 
continued: "It is a commonplace fact that 'police intelligence' and circumstantial evidence are, in 
combination, utilised in the investigation stage to further investigations and may be examined in 
the pre-prosecution stage in the decision-making process leading to the laying of criminal 
charges."  
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absence of reasonable and probable cause could also be described in that kind of 
case as the absence of a belief in the guilt of the plaintiff.103  
 
In terms of the sixth of the leading beacons of the tort, the court identified three 
critical points: 
 
a) It is the negative proposition that must be established: more probably than 
not the defendant prosecutor acted without reasonable and probable cause. 
b) That proposition may be established in either or both of two ways: the 
defendant prosecutor did not "honestly believe" the case that was instituted 
or maintained or the defendant prosecutor had no sufficient basis for such an 
honest belief. 
c) The critical question presented by this element of the tort is: what does the 
plaintiff demonstrate about what the defendant prosecutor made of the 
material that he or she had available when deciding whether to prosecute or 
maintain the prosecution? In effect, when the plaintiff asserts that the 
defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause, what exactly is the 
content of that assertion?104  
 
The seventh point is stated thus: unless the prosecutor is shown either not to have 
honestly formed the view that there was a proper case for prosecution or to have 
formed that view on an insufficient basis, the element of the absence of reasonable 
and probable cause is not established.105 With regard to the eighth of the principles, 
the majority noted that the expression "proper cause for prosecution" is not 
susceptible of exhaustive definition without obscuring the importance of the burden 
of proving the absence of reasonable and probable cause, and the variety of factual 
and forensic circumstances in which the questions may arise. It will require 
examination of the prosecutor’s state of persuasion about the material considered by 
the prosecutor. That should not be done by treating the five conditions stated by 
                                                 
103  A v NSW para 71. 
104  A v NSW para 77. 
105  A v NSW para 80. 
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Jordan CJ in Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd106 as a complete and exhaustive 
catalogue of what will constitute reasonable and probable cause. To begin with, to 
focus upon what is reasonable and probable cause distracts attention from what the 
plaintiff must establish - the absence of reasonable and probable cause. Again, 
because those conditions are framed in terms of a belief about probable guilt, they 
are conditions that do not sufficiently encompass cases where the prosecutor acts 
upon information provided by others.107 
 
In their ninth guideline, the majority addressed the issue of the objective element of 
reasonable and probable cause, which it said is sometimes couched in terms of the 
"ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser" or 
explained by reference to "evidence that persons of reasonably sound judgment 
would regard as sufficient for launching a prosecution". Or the question can be said 
to be "whether a reasonable man might draw the inference, from the facts known to 
him, that the accused was guilty".108 Finally, the court stated that to constitute 
malice, the dominant purpose of the prosecutor must be a purpose other than the 
proper invocation of the criminal law – an "illegitimate or oblique motive". That 
improper purpose must be the sole or dominant purpose actuating the prosecutor.109  
 
Lastly, the majority held that there was no basis upon which the Court of Appeal 
could interfere with the findings of facts made by the trial judge in this case. In 
particular, the findings made by the trial judge about what was said and meant by 
the second respondent in his conversations with the appellant’s solicitor were of 
critical importance. Those findings depended in important respects upon the 
assessment the trial judge made of the credibility of the evidence given by the 
second respondent and the appellant’s solicitor. There was no basis therefore for 
setting the findings aside.110 Furthermore, the trial judge’s conclusion was based 
upon what he found to have been the second respondent’s out-of-court admission – 
the second respondent’s statement that "if it was up to me I wouldn’t have charged 
                                                 
106  Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd 1938 38 SR (NSW) 466 469.  
107  A v NSW para 81. 
108  A v NSW para 83. Cf Crowley v Glissan 1905 2 CLR 744 (HCA). 
109  A v NSW para 91. 
110  A v NSW para 112. 
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him", coupled with the associated statements about pressure. There was no basis 
upon which it was open to the Court of Appeal to attribute a meaning to the second 
respondent’s statements that differed in any relevant respect from the way in which 
the trial judge understood them. It was therefore not open to the Court of Appeal to 
substitute its own finding about malice.111 
 
5.1 Noye v Robbins and Crimmins 
 
In Noye112 the Supreme Court of Western Australia was confronted with the case of 
a plaintiff who contended that the prosecution and the disciplinary charges instituted 
against him by a certain Inspector Robbins were brought maliciously and without 
any reasonable or probable cause. They were resolved, as far as they were capable 
of being resolved, in his favour without conviction; and the charges had caused him 
loss and damage in respect of which the action was maintainable. The plaintiff relied 
on additional causes of action of misfeasance in public office and injurious falsehood 
in his claims against Inspector Robbins. In his related action against Lynette 
Crimmins he alleged malicious prosecution and injurious falsehood. In substance, it 
was alleged that it was the malice and false accusations on the part of Crimmins 
which more or less caused the Inspector to lay the charges in the first instance.113  
 
On the question of whether or not the grounds which actuated the prosecutor to 
initiate proceedings sufficed to constitute reasonable and probable cause, it was held 
that, notwithstanding the complexity of the situation which had arisen and the 
conflicting views which existed at the time, Inspector Robbins did believe that the 
evidence disclosed a case against the plaintiff. This meant that he should be charged 
and put on trial. In effect, Inspector Robbins honestly formed the view that there 
was a proper case for prosecution.114 This was not a case where the crucial facts 
were or ever could have been within the personal knowledge of the prosecutor. 
Inspector Robbins had to rely on the information which he had obtained or which 
                                                 
111  A v NSW para 116. 
112  Noye para 43. 
113  Noye para 187. 
114  Noye para 681; Sharp v Biggs 1935 53 CLR 343 (HCA); Commonwealth Life Assurance Society 
Ltd v Brain 1935 53 CLR 343 (HCA); A v NSW paras 51-81. 
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was put before him. He could not rely on it by simply taking it at face value without 
having regard to factors which affected its cogency – obviously the tenuous 
credibility of Lynette Crimmins who was the only person who said that Noye had 
been promised or given money; but what he was required to do was to decide if, in 
his own view and on an objective basis, the evidence warranted putting the plaintiff 
on trial for the charges proposed and, in doing so, to act honestly for the purposes 
of bringing a wrongdoer to justice. It was obvious that the inspector had personally 
reached this decision after careful and anxious thought and with the guidance of 
superiors and advisors. It was his honest opinion that charges should be laid as they 
were.115 However, on the question of whether or not there were on an objective 
basis reasonable grounds for laying the charges,116 the trial judge held that, since 
the evidence upon which the charges were to be laid depended on the unreliable 
evidence of Lynette Crimmins, there was not a reasonable or probable basis upon 
which to lay the charges, notwithstanding that Inspector Robbins and some others 
believed that there was.117  
 
5.2 Continuing or maintaining the prosecution 
 
In Landini v State of New South Wales118 Hall J held that the element of reasonable 
and probable cause in the tort of malicious prosecution is not a purely objective one: 
 
It is not a concept regardless of the knowledge or belief of the prosecutor that 
there was reasonable and probable cause for a charge to be laid but also involves 
the issue as to whether the prosecutor had reasonable and probable cause to do 
what he did.119  
 
Although two police officers took active steps to maintain the prosecution of the 
plaintiff in relation to heroin allegedly found in his possession some three years 
previously, it turned out that these same officers were responsible for planting the 
said drug in the plaintiff’s vehicle. In the circumstances where evidence had been 
                                                 
115  Noye para 682. 
116  Noye paras 683-690. 
117  Noye para 690. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Noye v Robbins 2010 WASCA 
83 paras 67-70, 189.  
118  Landini v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWSC 1280. See also A v NSW para 61. 
119  Landini v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWSC 1280 para 35. 
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fabricated, it became obvious that the officers had maintained the prosecution 
maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. The case of the appellant 
therefore revolved around the argument that refraining from taking any steps or 
mere abstinence from doing anything was insufficient to support a claim for 
malicious prosecution. It was submitted on appeal that there was no evidence of the 
two officers- 
 
having actively prevented the giving of evidence by persons who [were] qualified so 
to do, having suppressed evidence or otherwise having done something. At its 
highest there was a failure to do something. That is insufficient to attract liability, if 
only because it denies the application of the rule which requires a coalescence of 
malice [and] absence of reasonable and probable cause, with an identifiable event 
or act in prosecuting the plaintiff.120 
 
After referring to the authorities on continuing prosecution in malicious prosecution 
cases,121 MacFarlan JA held that the conduct of the officer in question satisfied the 
requirement that, to be liable for malicious prosecution, a defendant "must play an 
active role in the conduct of the proceedings".122 The conduct must be such that at 
least the party gave evidence in support of the prosecution. What happened in this 
case was equivalent to such a conduct. Here, a document prepared by the officer for 
the purpose of evidence was, in his presence, tendered to the District Court as 
evidence. In these circumstances, anyone involved in the proceedings would have 
witnessed his preparedness, if need be, to mount the witness box to vouch to the 
contents of the document. For MacFarlan JA:  
 
His presence, without demur to the tender of the document, thus implicitly 
confirmed its veracity. It also involved (but went beyond) a suppression of the 
evidence that Mr Knox could have given as to the true circumstances of the arrest 
of the respondent.123  
 
                                                 
120  State of New South Wales v Landini 2010 NSWCA 157 para 51 (Landini) relying on Daniels v 
Telfer 1933 34 SR (NSW) 99; Coleman v Buckingham's Ltd 1963 63 SR (NSW) 171. 
121  See also Fitzjohn v Mackinder 1861 Eng R 293; Martin v Watson 1996 AC 74 89; Commercial 
Union Assurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Lamont 1989 3 NZLR 187 207-208.  
122  A v NSW para 34. 
123  Landini para 69. 
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In so doing, Mr Knox took active steps to maintain the prosecution of the 
respondent. This was sufficient to establish the liability of the appellant, which was 
vicariously liable for a relevant tort committed by the officer.124  
 
In the more recent case of Zreika v State of New South of Wales125 it was argued 
that there were occasions when the police should have stopped the prosecution. In 
effect, assuming that there was time when they had reasonable and probable cause, 
that time was finite: as police obtained more and more exculpatory evidence, 
indicating that they had the wrong person in their custody, they should at each 
stage have discontinued the proceedings. This argument is supported by the current 
definition of maintaining prosecution proffered by Simpson J in Hathaway v State of 
New South of Wales126 and uninterrupted by the Court of Appeal, which overturned 
the trial judgment on factual grounds.127 His Honour held that: 
 
Maintaining proceedings is a continuing process. It is conceivable that a prosecutor 
may act for proper reason (i.e. non-maliciously) or with reasonable and probable 
cause (or the plaintiff may be unable to prove malice, or the absence of reasonable 
or probable cause) at the time of institution of proceedings, but, at a later point in 
the proceedings, and while the proceedings are being maintained, the existence of 
malice or the absence of reasonable and probable cause may be shown. At any 
time at which the sole or dominant purpose of maintaining the proceedings 
becomes an improper (malicious) one, or the prosecutor becomes aware that 
reasonable and probable cause for the proceedings does not exist, or no longer 
exists, the proceedings ought to be terminated, or the prosecution is malicious.128 
 
Judge Walmsley was persuaded that, on a balance of probabilities, the defendant 
lacked reasonable and probable cause to continue with the prosecution from the first 
bail hearing onward. As to the objective aspect of the test laid down in A v State of 
New South of Wales129 there were the following factors: 
 
                                                 
124  Landini para 70. 
125  Zreika v State of New South Wales 2011 NSWDC 67 (Zreika). 
126  Hathaway v State of New South Wales 2009 NSWSC 116. 
127  Although this judgment was reversed on factual grounds in the Court of Appeal - State of New 
South Wales v Hathaway 2010 NSWCA 188 - Simpson J's statement of the law was not 
interfered with. 
128  State of New South Wales v Hathaway 2010 NSWCA 188 para 118.  
129  A v NSW para 77. 
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a) the extreme dissimilarity between the plaintiff and the description from 
information witnesses gave police about the man Michael, who was allegedly 
involved in the shooting; 
b) the lack of any eye-witness identifying the plaintiff as the offender; and 
c) the lack of any evidence of any connecting factor between the plaintiff and 
anyone associated with the shooting.130  
 
In conclusion, the trial judge held that the police lacked reasonable and probable 
cause from 26 July 2006 onward, when the plaintiff’s girlfriend swore in the Local 
Court on a bail application that he had been with her at the relevant time. The court 
further found that the police, in particular, Detective Constable Ryder, had no 
sufficient basis for any honest belief in the case she instituted and then maintained. 
She knew from 31 July after the witnesses failed to identify the plaintiff as the 
perpetrator of the offence in a photo array which included the photograph of the 
plaintiff, that the case lacked reasonable and probable cause.131 Thus, the 
prosecutor knew from 31 July 2006 that she had erred in arresting the plaintiff, and 
that she lacked reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution, but she 
maintained the case thereafter with that knowledge, hoping she would find enough 
evidence against him. Indeed, no reasonable person would have believed in the 
plaintiff’s guilt beyond 31 July 2006.132  
 
6 The approach of the Canadian Supreme Court  
 
In Nelles,133 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the tort of malicious prosecution 
requires not only proof of an absence of reasonable and probable cause for 
commencing the proceedings but also proof of an improper purpose or motive. Such 
a motive must involve an abuse or perversion of the system of criminal justice for 
ends it was not designed to serve and as such incorporates an abuse of the office of 
the Attorney General and his agents the Crown Attorneys. In Proulx, the plaintiff’s 
                                                 
130  Zreika para 241 read along paras 68, 140. 
131  Zreika para 247. 
132  Zreika para 293. 
133  Nelles 192-193.  
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former girlfriend was murdered in 1982. A coroner’s inquest brought to light some 
circumstantial evidence casting suspicion on the plaintiff, but his presence at the 
scene of the murder was not established. In 1983 the police surreptitiously recorded 
a conversation concerning the murder between the plaintiff and the victim’s father. 
The plaintiff speculated about the murderer’s conduct and motivations, but explicitly 
denied having committed it. In 1986 the prosecutor concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to charge the plaintiff or anyone else. In 1991 a radio station 
broadcast allegations linking the plaintiff to the murder. The plaintiff brought an 
action in defamation against the radio station, a journalist, and a retired police 
officer. A witness who saw the plaintiff’s photograph’s in a newspaper article 
approached the radio station and stated that he recognised the plaintiff’s eyes as 
those of a man he had encountered on the night of the murder. The retired officer 
showed the witness a photograph of the plaintiff with his eyes covered. The witness 
affirmed that they were the eyes of the man he had seen: however, when the 
witness was shown the full photograph, he stated that the plaintiff was not the man 
he had seen. 
 
The Crown prosecutor then met with the witness and the retired officer. The 
prosecutor showed the witness eight photographs of the plaintiff and the witness 
identified one of them as the man he had seen. The prosecutor consulted his 
superiors and colleagues before charging the plaintiff with first degree murder. At 
the trial, the witness was not asked to identify the plaintiff. In his closing address to 
the jury the prosecutor invited the jury to substitute "I" for "he" in the plaintiff’s 
recorded speculations about the murderer’s motivation. The plaintiff was found 
guilty. The Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the conviction on the ground that the 
verdict was unreasonable, and entered an acquittal. The Court of Appeal held that 
the identification procedure was seriously flawed, and that the recording of the 
conversation between the plaintiff and the victim’s father was inadmissible under 
section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The plaintiff then 
brought an action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Quebec. 
The trial judge found that there were no reasonable and probable grounds for laying 
charges against the plaintiff; that the prosecutor had acted on an improper motive, 
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and the Attorney General was therefore liable. The Attorney General’s appeal was 
allowed by the Court of Appeal. 
 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and 
restored the trial judgment. Having reiterated the Nelles tests and holding that the 
first and second of them were met in this case, the majority zeroed in on the third 
and fourth elements. In their joint judgment, Lacobucci J and Binnie J (McLachlin 
CJC and Major J concurring), held that the prosecutor had to have sufficient 
evidence to believe that guilt could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
have reasonable and probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings. The 
identification procedure in the present case was extremely flawed and unusual,134 
and the deficiencies in the identification must have been obvious to the prosecutor 
from the outset. The prosecutor ought to have known that the recording of the 
conversation between the plaintiff and the victim’s father was inadmissible,135 and 
that even if the tapes were admissible, they had no probative value.136 The charges 
brought against the plaintiff were based on fragments of tenuous, unreliable and 
likely inadmissible evidence; they were grounded in mere suspicion and hypotheses 
and could not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The proceedings were 
accordingly not based on reasonable and probable grounds.137   
 
According to the Supreme Court in Miazga 2, it is well established that the 
reasonable and probable cause inquiry comprises both a subjective and an objective 
component, so that for such grounds to exist there must be actual belief on the part 
of the prosecutor and that belief must be reasonable in the circumstances. However, 
principles established in suits between private parties cannot simply be transposed 
to cases involving Crown defendants without necessary modification. While the 
accuser’s personal belief in the probable guilt of the accused may be an appropriate 
standard in a private suit, it is not a suitable definition of the subjective element of 
reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution against Crown 
                                                 
134  Proulx para 12. 
135  Proulx para 28 relying on R v Duarte 1990 65 DLR (4th) 240 (SCC). 
136  Proulx para 29. 
137  Proulx para 34. 
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counsel. The reasonable and probable cause inquiry is not concerned with a 
prosecutor’s personal views as to the guilt of the accused, but with his or her 
professional assessment of the legal strength of the case.138 
 
Given the burden of proof in a criminal trial, belief in "probable" guilt means that the 
prosecutor believes, based on the existing state of affairs that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt could be made out in a court of law. The public interest is engaged 
in a public prosecution and the Crown attorney is duty-bound to act solely in the 
public interest in making the decision whether to initiate or continue a prosecution. 
This decision may not entirely accord with the individual prosecutor’s personal views 
about a case, but Crown counsel must take care not to substitute his or her own 
views for that of the judge or jury. Furthermore, where the action is taken against a 
Crown attorney, the inquiry into the prosecutor’s subjective state of belief does not 
properly belong at the third stage of the test. In the context of a public prosecution, 
the third element necessarily turns on an objective assessment of the existence of 
sufficient cause.139 If the court concludes, on the basis of the circumstances known 
to the prosecutor at the relevant time, that reasonable and probable cause existed 
to commence or continue a criminal prosecution from an objective standpoint, the 
criminal process was properly employed, and the inquiry need go no further. If a 
judge determines that no objective grounds for the prosecution existed at the 
relevant time, the court must proceed to the next inquiry, into the fourth element of 
the test for malicious prosecution.140 
 
On the question of malice, the Supreme Court held that "malice" is a question of 
fact, requiring evidence that the prosecutor was impelled by an "improper 
purpose".141 Accordingly, the malice element of the test will be made out when a 
court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the defendant Crown prosecutor 
commenced or continued the impugned prosecution with a purpose inconsistent with 
his or her role as a "minister of justice". The plaintiff had to demonstrate on the 
                                                 
138  Miazga 2 paras 58, 59, 63. 
139  Miazga 2 para 73. 
140  Miazga 2 paras 76, 77. 
141  Miazga 2 para 78. See also per Lamer J in Nelles193-194. 
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totality of the evidence that the prosecutor deliberately intended to subvert or abuse 
the office of the Attorney General or the process of criminal justice so that he or she 
exceeded the boundaries of the office of the Attorney General.142 The need to 
consider the "totality of all the circumstances" simply meant that a court should 
review all the evidence related to the prosecutor’s state of mind, including any 
evidence of a lack of belief in the existence of reasonable and probable cause, in 
deciding whether the prosecution was in fact fuelled by an improper purpose.143 
While the absence of a subjective belief in reasonable and probable cause was 
relevant to the malice inquiry, it did not equate with malice and did not dispense 
with the requirement of proof of an improper purpose.144 By requiring proof of an 
improper purpose, the malice element ensured that liability would not be imposed in 
cases where a prosecutor proceeded absent reasonable and probable grounds by 
reason of incompetence, inexperience, poor judgment, lack of professionalism, 
laziness, recklessness, honest mistake, negligence or even gross negligence.145 
Malice required the plaintiff to prove that the prosecutor wilfully perverted or abused 
the office of the Attorney General or the process of criminal justice. The third and 
fourth elements of the tort must not be conflated.146 
 
7 Prosecution instigated with reasonable and probable cause  
 
The facts of Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe147 were somewhat bizarre. The 
plaintiff had been apprehended as the con man who under a credit agreement had 
taken a computer and subsequently absconded. The debtor had given false names 
and identity. The plaintiff was accosted by a salesman of the computer dealer and 
when he came forward with his identity, he was arrested and detained by the police. 
He was charged and appeared in court but the charges were later withdrawn. It was 
a case of mistaken identity. The plaintiff was successful at the trial and was awarded 
damages for wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution but the Supreme Court of 
                                                 
142  Miazga 2 para 89. 
143  Miazga 2 para 85. 
144  Miazga 2 para 86. 
145  Miazga 2 para 81. 
146  Miazga 2 para 80. 
147  Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe 2007 1 All SA 375 (SCA) (Relyant Trading). 
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Appeal overturned that award. It was held that to succeed in an action based on 
wrongful arrest the plaintiff must show that the defendant himself, or someone 
acting as his agent or employee deprived him of his liberty.148 Generally, where the 
defendant merely furnishes a police officer with information on the strength of which 
the latter decides to arrest the plaintiff, the defendant does not become the one who 
performed the arrest.149 Accordingly, the claim for wrongful arrest of the computer 
dealer must fail, since the arrest was made by the police and not the dealer or its 
employees.150 
 
Liability for malicious prosecution depended not only on an "instigation" - a term of 
"some complexity" - of the prosecution, but also on the absence of reasonable and 
probable cause and the presence of animus iniuriandi. This must involve an 
investigation into the state of mind of the dealer’s employees and, in particular, the 
employee who purportedly identified the plaintiff. The liability or otherwise of the 
defendant would depend on whether or not he had information that led him to 
believe on objective grounds that the plaintiff was guilty. Here there was the need 
that persons who had reasonable and probable cause for a prosecution should not 
be deterred from setting the criminal process in motion against those who they 
believed had committed offences, even if in so doing they were actuated by indirect 
and improper motives.151 The court came to the conclusion that the employee who 
identified the plaintiff honestly believed that the plaintiff was the person who 
defrauded her employers. Any reasonable person in her position acting on the 
information available would have concluded that the plaintiff was probably the 
person who committed the offence in question. The plaintiff therefore failed to show 
that the dealer acted without reasonable and probable cause.152  
                                                 
148  Smit v Meyerton Outfitters 1971 1 SA 137 (T) 140D-E. 
149  Relyant Trading para 6; Birch v Johannesburg City Council 1949 1 SA 231 (T) 238-239.  
150  Relyant Trading para 8. 
151  Relyant Trading para 14; Beckenstrater v Rottcher and Theunissen 1955 1 SA 129 (A) 135D-E.  
152  Relyant Trading para 15. Cf in Bayett v Bennett 2012 ZAGPJHC 9 paras 168-169, 173 where it 
was held that the defendants chose to depose to affidavits for purposes of the criminal complaint 
not only by making false and distorted allegations but also by omitting to disclose full material 
facts to the police. They knew that they had no reasonable or probable cause to believe, based 
on reasonable grounds, that the institution of criminal proceedings was justified, but had an 
ulterior purpose in instituting those proceedings.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
An attempt has been made in this article to identify the boundaries of reasonable 
and probable cause in malicious prosecution, and reasonable grounds to suspect in 
the case of unlawful arrest and detention and the tort of abuse of process. The point 
was made that the requirement of reasonable and probable cause plays such a 
central role in an action for malicious prosecution that the success of such an action 
depends largely on there being a lack of reasonable and probable cause for the 
prosecution among the other three requirements. The presence or absence of 
reasonable and probable cause more or less dictates whether or not there is any 
basis for the prosecution and leads the way to the inquiry as to whether there was 
malice or improper purpose on the part of the prosecutor. Again, whether or not the 
defendant lacked reasonable and probable cause to instigate, initiate or continue the 
prosecution depends ultimately on the facts and information carefully collected and 
objectively assessed, on which the prosecutor based his/her belief that the plaintiff 
was guilty; it is not the probability that those facts would secure a conviction. Yet 
the prosecutor is faced with the difficulty in that his/her conduct in this regard is 
subject to both the subjective and objective tests. In evaluating the material that is 
available to him/her arising from the investigations, the objective sufficiency of the 
material must be considered by the prosecutor and assessed in the light of all the 
facts of the particular case. In effect, his/her belief must be honestly held and 
founded on reasonable grounds, such that would lead a reasonable person in his/her 
position to hold a similar belief. It essentially requires the plaintiff to establish a 
negative, rather than for the defendant to prove the existence of reasonable and 
probable cause. 
 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
274 / 536 
 
Bibliography 
 
American Law Institute Torts 
American Law Institute Restatement of the Law: Torts 2nd ed (American Law 
Institute St Paul, Minn 1965-) 
 
Bullen and Leake Precedents of Pleadings 
Bullen E and Leake SM Precedents of Pleadings in Actions in the Superior 
Courts of Common Law 3rd ed (Stevens & Sons London 1868) 
 
Burchell Personality Rights 
Burchell JM Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio 
Iniuriarum (Juta Cape Town 1998) 
 
Clerk, Lindsell and Dugdale Torts 
Clerk JF, Lindsell WBH and Dugdale AM Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 19th ed 
(Sweet & Maxwell London 2006) 
 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 
Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict 6th ed (LexisNexis 
Butterworths Durban 2010) 
 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 
Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Neethling’s Law of Personality 2nd ed 
(LexisNexis Butterworths Durban 2005) 
 
Robertson and Jastrzebski Halsbury’s Laws of England 
Robertson M and Jastrzebski J (eds) Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 45(2): 
Torts 4th ed (Butterworths London 1994) 
 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
275 / 536 
 
Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 
Rogers WVH (ed) Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 18th ed (Sweet & Maxwell 
London 2010) 
 
Register of cases 
 
Australia 
  
A v New South Wales 2007 230 CLR 500 (HCA) 
Birchmeier v Council of Municipality of Rockdale 1934 51 WN (NSW) 201 
Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd 1963 63 SR (NSW) 
Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain 1935 53 CLR 343 (HCA) 
Crowley v Glissan 1905 2 CLR 744 (HCA) 
Daniels v Telfer 1933 34 SR (NSW) 
George v Rocket 1990 170 CLR 104 (HCA) 
Hathaway v State of New South Wales 2009 NSWSC 116 
Landini v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWSC 1280 
Mitchell v John Heine and Son Ltd 1938 38 SR (NSW) 466 
Noye v Robbins and Crimmins 2007 WASC 98, 2010 WASCA 83 
Ruddock v Taylor 2005 222 CLR 612 (HCA) 
Sharp v Biggs 1932 48 CLR 81 (HCA) 
State of New South Wales v Hathaway 2010 NSWCA 188 
State of New South Wales v Landini 2010 NSWCA 157 
Thomas v State of New South Wales 2008 NSWCA 316 
Trobridge v Hardy 1955 94 CLR 147 
Zaravinos v NSW 2005 214 ALR 234 (NSWCA) 
Zreika v State of New South Wales 2011 NSWDC 67 
 
Canada 
 
Chartier v Quebec (Attorney General) 1979 2 SCR 474 (SCC) 
Collins v Brantford Police Services Board 2001 204 DLR (4th) 669 (OntCA) 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
276 / 536 
 
Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board 2007 3 SCR 129 (SCC) 
Hudson v Brantford Police Services Board 2001 204 DLR (4th) 645 (OntCA) 
Miazga v Kvello Estate 2009 3 SCR 339 (SCC), 2008 282 DLR (4th) 1 (Sask CA) 
Nelles v Ontario 1989 2 SCR 170 (SCC) 
PHE v Ottawa-Carleton (Region) Police Service 2003 OJ No 3512 (SCJ) 
Proulx v Quebec (Attorney General) 2001 206 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC) 
R v Duarte 1990 65 DLR (4th) 240 (SCC) 
R v Golub 1997 34 OR (3d) 743 (ONCA) 
R v Hall 1995 22 OR (3d) 289 (Ont CA) 
R v Storrey 1990 1 SCR 241, 1990 53 CCC (3d) 316 (SCC)  
R v Wilson 1990 1 SCR 1291 (SCC) 
Wiche v Ontario 2001 CanLII 28413 (ON SC) 
 
England 
 
A v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2003 1 All ER 816 (CA) 
Abbott v Refuge Assurance Co Ltd 1961 3 All ER 1074 
Abrath v The North Eastern Railway Company 1882-1883 11 QBD 440 
Al Fayeed v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis 2004 EWCA Civ 1579 (CA) 
Alford v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Police 2009 EWCA Civ 100 
Bradshaw v Waterlow and Sons Ltd 1915 3 KB 527 
Broad v Ham 1839 5 Bing NC 722 
Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey 1996 LGR 241 (CA) 
Dallison v Caffrey 1964 3 WLR 385 (CA) 
Fitzjohn v Mackinder 1861 Eng R 293 
Gibbs v Rea 1998 AC 786 
Gilding v Eyre 1861 142 ER 584 
Glinski v McIver 1962 AC 726 (HL) 
Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd 1977 2 All ER 566 
Grainger v Hill 1882-1883 11 QBD 440 
Gregory v Portsmouth City Council 2000 1 All ER 560 (HL) 
Herniman v Smith 1938 AC 305 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
277 / 536 
 
Hicks v Faulkner 1878 8 QBD 167 
Holgate-Mohammed v Duke 1984 AC 437 (HL) 
Howarth v Gwent Constabulary 2011 EWHC 2836 (QB) 
Hussien v Chong Fook Kam 1970 AC 942 (HL) 
Land Securities Ltd v Fladgate Fielder 2010 2 All ER 741 (CA) 
Lister v Perryman 1870 LR 4 HL 521 
Martin v Watson 1996 AC 74 (HL) 
Metall and Rohstoff v Donaldson Luflein and Jenrette Inc 989 3 All ER 14 (CA), 1990 
1 QB 391 
Moulton v Chief Constable of the West Midlands 2010 EWCA Civ 524 
O’Hara v Chief Constable of RUC 1997 AC 286 (HL) 
Quartz Hill Consolidated Mining Co v Eyre 1881-1885 All ER Rep Ext 1474 (CA) 
Re A Debtor 1955 2 All ER 65 
Riches v DPP 1973 2 All ER 935 (CA) 
Savill v Roberts 1698 12 Mod Rep 208, 88 ER 1267 
Speed Seal Products Ltd v Paddington 1986 1 All ER 91  
 
New Zealand 
 
Attorney General v Hewitt 2000 2 NZLR 110 (HC) 
Caie v Attorney General 2005 NZAR 703 (HC) 
Commercial Union Assurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Lamont 1989 3 NZLR 187 
Duffy v Attorney General 1985 CRNZ 599 
Hussien v Chong Fook Kam 1970 AC 942 (PC) 
Neilsen v Attorney General 20013 NZLR 433 (CA) 
Niao v Attorney General High Court, Rotorua CP 22/96, 11 June 1998 
Police v Anderson 1972 NZLR 233 
Zaoui v Attorney General 2004 NZCA 228 (CA) 
 
South Africa 
 
Bayett v Bennett 2012 ZAGPJHC 9 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
278 / 536 
 
Beckenstrater v Rottcher & Theunissen 1955 1 SA 129 (A) 
Birch v Johannesburg City Council 1949 1 SA 231 (T) 
Charles v Minister of Safety and Security 2007 2 SACR 137 (W) 
Donono v Minister of Prisons 1973 4 SA 259 (C) 
Duncan v Minister of Law and Order 1986 2 SA 805 (A) 
Gellman v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 1 SACR 446 (W) 
Heyns v Venter 2004 3 SA 200 (T) 
Highstead Entertainment (Pty) Ltd t/a ‘The Club’ v Minister of Law and Order 1994 1 
SA 387 (C) 
Joubert v Nedbank Ltd 2011 ZAECPEHC 28 
Lederman v Moharal Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 1 SA 190 (A) 
Le Roux v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 4 SA 491 (KZP) 
Louw v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 2 SACR 178 (T) 
Mabona v Minister of Law and Order 1988 2 SA 654 (SE) 
Maharaj v Government of RSA 2012 ZAKZDHC 6 
Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A) 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko 2008 3 All SA 47 (SCA) 
Minister of Law and Order v Hurley 1986 3 SA 568 (A) 
Minister of Law and Order v Pavlicevic 1989 3 SA 679 (A) 
Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 1 SACR 315 (SCA) 
Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 3 SA 98 (A) 
Mvu v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 6 SA 82 (GSJ) 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) 
Newman v Prinsloo 1973 1 SA 125 (T) 
R v van Heerden 1958 3 SA 150 (T) 
Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 1 SACR 211 (E) 
Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe 2007 1 All SA 375 (SCA) 
Rosseou v Boshoff 1945 CPD 145 
Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security 2007 3 All SA 271 (T), 2009 5 SA 94 (SCA) 
Russel v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 ZAECHC 161 
S v Khanyapa 1979 1 SA 824 (A) 
S v Lubaxa 2001 2 All SA 107 (A) 
C OKPALUBA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
279 / 536 
 
S v Shininda 1986 1 SA 573 (T) 
S v Suhuping 1983 2 SA 119 (B) 
Smit v Meyerton Outfitters 1971 1 SA 137 (T) 
Thompson v Minister of Police 1971 1 SA 371 (E) 
Todt v Ipser 1993 3 SA 577 (A) 
Tsose v Minister of Justice 1951 3 SA 10 (A) 
Visagie v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 ZAECHC 2 
Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 4 SA 458 (CC) 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop 2005 2 WLR 1324 (PC) 
Baptiste v Seepersad and Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago HC 367 of 2001 
(unreported) 
Kennedy Cecil v Morris Donna and Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2005 
TTCA 28 (T&T CA) 
Mahadeo Sookhai v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2007 TTHC 47 
Mohamed Amin v Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee 1947 AC 322 (PC) 
Rambajan Baboolal v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 2001 TTHC 17 
 
United States 
 
Chatfield v Comerford 1866 4 F & F 1008 
Fink et al v Sharwangunk Conservancy Inc 790 NYS 2d (10 February 2005)  
 
Register of legislation 
 
Canadian Criminal Code, 1985 
Crime Act, 1961 (New Zealand) 
Crimes Act 1900-24 (Australia) 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (RSA) 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (UK)  
